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THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO
DISCLOSE UNDER RULE 1OB-5
I.

INTRODUCTION

The linchpin of federal securities law is full disclosure of information in order that investors have the opportunity to make informed investment decisions. An administrative device created to implement this
theme is rule lOb-5,1 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b)2 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 Because section 10(b) is a catchall
provision designed to prevent fraudulent activities, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the judicial branch have had to
delineate the parameters of lOb-5. 5
Perusal of the generic language of lOb-5 6 reveals that false
statements and misleading half-truths, made in the purchase or sale of
any security, are clearly prohibited. The unlawful nature of nondisclosure of material nonpublic information, however, is not
specifically addressed. The rule simply does not state "whether silence
1. The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 10b-5].
2. Section 10(b) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1980).
3. Id. §§ 78a-78hh.
4. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
5. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975), the
case law which has developed under lOb-5 was metaphorically compared to "a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."
6. See, e.g., Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23, 35 (N.D. M. 1975)
("genius of lOb-5 lies in its breath").
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may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device."' Unlike active
misrepresentation, failure to disclose material nonpublic information,
prior to trading securities, amounts to fraud only when the silence is in
breach of an affirmative duty to disclose.' The duty to disclose,
established by administrative and judicial decisions, has devolved upon
corporate insiders, 9 the tippee of an insider,'" and one standing in a
special relationship with the purchaser or seller of the security." Absent one of these essential relationships, with the corporation affected
by the information or with the injured party, the case unanimously
hold that there is no duty to disclose. 2
Recently, an alternative theory was proffered, extending the duty
to disclose to the market insider, a person who regularly receives
material nonpublic information.'" Although the United States
Supreme Court, in United States v. Chiarella," expressly rejected this
7. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1113 (1980).
8. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir.
1975); Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963). See 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION, Chapter 9C (1961)[hereinafter cited as 3 Loss].
9. An "insider" is anyone whose relationship to a corporation gives them "access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See notes 64-95 and
accompanying text infra.
10. The term "tippee" seems to have first been denominated by Professor Loss. 6
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3561 (1961)[hereinafter cited as 6 Loss]. A "tippee"
is someone with no relation to the company who receives inside information from an
insider and "knew or had reason to know" that the information was nonpublic. In re
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971). Some courts and commentators
have not used the tippee terminology, because, they argue, tippees are insiders, even
though they have no position in the corporate hierarchy. See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263
F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The difficulty is merely one of judicial semantics, since
rule lob-5 is capable of being applicable to "any person." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1980). Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule lob-5, U. ILL. L.F. 55, 55 (1976). See
notes 96-128 and accompanying text infra.
11. One who occupies a position of trust and confidence with a trading party,
typically a fiduciary relationship, has a duty to disclose because of that relationship.
See notes 129-134 and accompanying text infra.
12. S.E.C. v. Great Am. Indus. Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). See
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 804 (1973)[hereinafter cited as
Fleischer]; 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 741(6)(b), at 179-83
(1977)[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG).
13.
"Market information" is information about events which affect the
marketability of a corporation's securities without affecting the corporation's assets or
earning power. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 799. Whereas "inside information" has
been defined as nonpublic facts relating to the issuer's business or which are usually intended to be available only for a corporate purpose. See generally 5 A. JACOBS, THE
IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 66.62(b) (rev. ed. 1978).
14. 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
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novel concept, it is useful, analytically, in examing the scope of the duty
to disclose under lOb-5.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY FOR NONDISCLOSURE

The Duty to Disclose Under the Common Law

A.

At common law, a party to a securities transaction was protected
from material misrepresentations, made to induce reliance upon the
false statement, which resulted in his detriment. Oftentimes, an action
for fraud would not lie, however, for mere nondisclosure.' 5 No remedy
was available for damages sustained as a consequence of the other
party's silence, unless there was an affirmative duty of disclosure.' 6
The imposition of a duty to disclose was generally triggered by a
fiduciary or other relation of trust and confidence between the
parties.' 7
The most common situation in which the question of a duty had
been litigated involved security transactions between directors of the
corporation and individual stockholders. Where the director actively
misled the shareholder or made false misrepresentations, the case was
decided without reference to the nature of the relation between them.'"
More frequently, a director would have knowledge affecting the value
of stock, gained in his official capacity with the corporation and merely
remain silent about the information in the transaction with the
stockholder. Assuming the director refrained from affirmatively
misrepresenting information acquired through his position as an insider he could usually trade in shares of his corporation with
impunity.' 9 Thus, in the absence of a duty to disclose, the failure of
the director to disclose facts pertaining to corporate affairs was not actionable. Although a director had a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to the stockholders collectively in his management of the
15. See, e.g., Boileau v. Records & Breen, 165 Iowa 134, 144 N.W. 336 (1913);
Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921).
16. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969). The

American Law Institute has declared that "silence when there is a duty to speak may
be a fraudulent act." ALI, Federal Securities Code § 262(b) (Proposed Official Draft
1978).
17. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 106 at 697 (4th ed. 1971) and cases cited
therein. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 551 (1938).
18. The ordinary rules of fraud would apply when a misrepresentation was made
by a director to a shareholder. Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528 (1885); Morrison v. Snow,
26 Utah 247, 72 P. 924 (1903). Note, Corporations-Directors-Relation of Director

to Individual Stockholder From Whom He Purchases Shares of the Corporation, 14
MiNN. L. REV. 530, 531 (1930).
19.

Carpenter v. Danford, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868).
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corporation,"0 the courts were divided on the nature of the relation
between a director and individual stockholders.
Under the common law majority view, which has been described as
the "strict rule," no fiduciary relationship existed between a director
and individual stockholders; hence, the insider had not duty to disclose
information pertaining to corporate affairs. " A director could deal
with a stockholder as freely as he might with a stranger without being
accountable for withholding information which affected the value of
the stock." The rationale of this view is that because of the interposition of the corporate entity, the director did not occupy a position of
trust in relation to the various holdings of individual stockholders. 3
The stock was regarded as the personal property of each stockholder
over which the director had no control.2 4 The nonrecognition of a
fiduciary duty to the shareholder permitted directors," officers, 6 and
persons who occupied both positions "7 to trade securities without explication. I
The minority view was that a fiduciary relationship existed between
a director and individual shareholders, with the consequent imposition
of a duty to disclose, by disregarding the fictional corporate entity
some courts deemed a director to be not only a trustee for the corporation, but also as a trustee for individual stockholders. 9 Some critics
have theorized that information regarding the value of shares, which a
director acquires by virtue of his corporate position, is a quasi-asset of
the corporation held in trust for the benefit of individual
20. E.g., Conolly v. Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 A. 234 (1929), aff'd per
curiam, 107 N.J. 180, 151 A. 905 (1930); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266
(1922). See 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
838 at 142 (Perm. ed. 1975).
21. Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 381, 159 P.2d 224, 228 (1945) (dictum); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 361-62, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933); Seitz v. Frey, 152
Minn. 170, 174, 188 N.W. 266, 268 (1922).
22. DuPont v. DuPont, 242 F. 98, 136 (D.C. Del 1917), cert. denied, 250 U.S.
642 (1918); Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 111.444, 456, 74 N.E. 445, 447 (1905).
23. Bigelow, The Relation of Director of a Corporation to Individual
Stockholders, 81 CENT. L.J. 256, 261 (1915).
24. Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905).
25. E.g., Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Carpenter v.
Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868).
26. E.g., Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922).
27. E.g., Connolly v. Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 A. 234 (1929), aff'd per
curiam, 107 N.J. Eq. 180, 151 A. 905 (1930).
28. Note, Civil Liabilities Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 548
(1956)[hereinafter cited as Civil Liabilities].
29. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Dawson v. National Life
Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916).
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stockholders. 30 Conceding that corporate information may be a quasiasset of the corporation, it must be concluded that because of the
separate legal status of a corporation and its owners and agents the
director's agency status exists only to the aggregate body of stockholders."' The confidence placed by the stockholders in the director
relates to the management of the corporate business and not the
separate affairs of each stockholder. 32 The stockholder's right to
redress a director's wrong against the corporation, which incidentally
33 The
affects the value of corporate assets, is only derivative.
stockholder suffers, if at all, vicariously through the corporation.
When the activities of the director affect the assets of the corporation,
and concomitantly the value of the stockholder's shares, all stockholders suffer. 34 The director's conduct in trading shares of the corporation without disclosure of nonpublic information, however, does
not directly affect the assets of the corporation. In this instance, the
shareholder with whom the director has traded, and not the corporation, is the proper party to complain.3"
The ordinary principles of fiduciary duty are, therefore, not applicable to the relationship of a director and individual stockholders,
and without the imposition of this duty the director is not required to
assume the responsibilities of a trustee. 3" The relation of directorshareholder simply does not fit neatly into any of the traditional
fiduciary categories. Nevertheless, this fiduciary duty has been found
30. See supra note 18, at 535 and cases cited therein at footnote 30.
31. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
32. Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE L.J.
731, 734 (1918).
33. Board of Comm'n of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1893).
34. See supra note 32, at 733.
35. Id.
36. The court in Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903), conceded that
because of the separate legal status of a corporation, a director's relationship to individual shareholders is not that of a trustee in the usual sense of the word. In justifying the imposition of a duty to disclose, the court stated:
All the authorities agree that he (the director) is trustee for the company, and in
his capacity as such he serves the interests of the Entire body of stockholders, as
well as those of the individual shareholders, who usually cannot sue in his own
name for wrongs done the company by the officer. But the fact that he is trustee
for all is not to be perverted into holding that he is under no obligation to each...
[N]o process of reasoning and no amount of argument can destroy the fact that
the director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the
stockholder. Not a strict trustee, since he does not hold title to the shares, not
even a strict trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with his cestui que
trust, but a quasi trustee as to the shareholders interest in the shares.
Id. at 367, 45 S.E. at 233-34. See Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 379,
157 N.W. 929, 934 (1916).
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to exist. 37 The endeavor by those courts to enlarge the law governing
fiduciaries so as to include the director-shareholder relationship appears to be precipitated by practical and moral prejudices." The
desirability of finding a fiduciary relation is bottomed on the moral inequities that would result from the director, by virtue of his unequal
bargaining position, being able to take advantage of stockholders. 3 9
To avoid the severity of the majority view some courts adopted an
intermediate position, by application of the "special facts" doctrine
enunciated in the seminal case of Strong v. Repide.' ° In Strong, the
defendant, as director, controlling shareholder, and officer of a corporation, acted as chief negotiator for the sale of the corporation's
land at a price which would greatly enhance the value of the shares.
The defendant concealed his identity as a purchaser of the plaintiff's
shares through a broker, and obtained the shares for a price substantially less than they were worth. The Court held that because of the insider's special knowledge under the circumstances "it became the duty
of the defendant, acting in good faith, to state the facts before making
the purchase."'
The "special facts" doctrine neither supports nor repudiates the
majority rule that a director owes no affirmative fiduciary duty of
37. This view has met the approval of numerous legal commentators. See Laylen,
The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE L.J. 73.1 (1918); Smith,
Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 19 MICH. L.
REV. 698 (1921); Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporations by a Director from a
Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1910).
38. In Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903), the court said that to permit a director to take advantage of his position "would offer a premium for faithless
silence, and give a reward for the suppression of truth." Id. at 370, 45 S.E. at 235.
39. In finding a fiduciary duty the court in Dawson v. National Life Ins., Co.,
176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916), considered the injustice in permitting a director to
take advantage of his official position.
The debate as to whether technically a fiduciary relation exists may and doubtless
will go on, but a knowledge of the law is not required to appreciate the moral
wrong perpetrated by a corporate officer with knowledge acquired by virtue of his
position in profiting on the ignorance of a stockholder.
Id. at 375-76, 157 N.W. at 933. See Wilgus, supra note 37, at 267.
40. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
41. Id. at 431. 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 1447. The court took cognizance of the
"strict rule," noting that because of the "special circumstances" the director had a duty to disclose.
If it were conceded, for the purpose of argument, that the ordinary relations between directors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of such a
fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to a shareholder
the general knowledge which he may possess regarding the value of the shares of
the company before he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are cases
where by reason of the special facts, such duty exists.
213 U.S. at 431.
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disclosure to the stockholders with whom he trades. 2 Rather, the doctrine is an attempt to disparage the harshness of the majority view by
finding exceptions which will give rise to a fiduciary duty in special circumstances.' 3 Manifestly, the "special facts" doctrine is premised on a
relationship between director and shareholder which is different from
the relationship between arms-length traders." The directorstockholder relationship in Strong was a necessary requisite for finding
the special circumstances, namely, that the defendant had been entrusted with the negotiations to sell the corporation's assets. Had the
defendant not been a director there would not have been a fiduciary
relation with the trading stockholder." ' The Court, however, took
as a director was
great pains to emphasize that the defendant's position
6
considered.'
was
which
facts
the
of
only one
The "special facts" doctrine, thus, imposes a duty to disclose
under exceptional circumstances when the corporate insider possesses
peculiar knowledge enhancing the value of the stock."' The courts
which have applied the doctrine admit that there is no fiduciary relation between a director and individual stockholders with respect to the
trading of stock in a corporation. Essentially, a director with superior
knowledge of corporate affairs stands in a special relation to a
stockholder. Outstanding corporate facts which have implicated the
"special facts" doctrine include the director's undisclosed knowledge
'
concerning a prospective corporate reorganization," probable liquida0
tion of the corporation,"' sales of large blocks of assets," and impending declarations of unusual dividends." The doctrine, which remains
basically ill-defined,' 2 has been an impediment to directors who have
attempted to take advantage of a stockholder's ignorance.
42. Note, A New Concept of Fraudon the Securities Exchange-A Comment on
In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 15 S.C.L. REv. 557, 563 (1963)[hereinafter cited as A New
Concept].
43. H. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 213 (rev. ed. 1946)[hereinafter cited as
BALLENTINE].
44. 3 Loss supra note 8, at 1447. See Petter v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).

45.

3 Loss supra note 8, at 1447.

46.

213 U.S. at 431.

48.
49.

E.g., Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 263 N.W. 650 (1935).
E.g., Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945).

47. Those special circumstances producing exceptional cases were enumerated in
Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 508, 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925), as "an assured
sale, merger, or other fact or condition enhancing the value of the stock, known by the
officer or officers, not known by the shareholder, and not to be ascertained by an inspection of the books."
50.
(1935).
51.
52.

E.g., Bollstron v. Duplex Power Car Co., 167 Minn. 171, 208 N.W. 650
E.g., Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
Supra note 18, at 534.

Published by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OFDA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2

Those courts which have acknowledged the existence of a director's
duty of disclosure have been reluctant to extend that duty where the
director has traded listed securities through the medium of a stock exchange. 3 Typically, the trading of stock on a stock exchange is impersonal, because of the anonymity separating buyer and seller. 54 As a
practical matter, the machinery of the stock exchange does not permit
the director to make a personal disclosure to the other party of the
transaction." The courts which have expressed disfavor with the
potential for unethical conduct on an impersonal exchange have simply
been hindered by the rigid requirements of the common law
remedies. '
B.

Duty of Disclosure Under Rule X-10-5

The inadequacies of the common law remedies coupled with the
multifarious interpretations of its nondisclosure rules, prompted enactment of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and rule lOb-5.
These anti-fraud provisions provide a broad framework within which
the courts and the SEC may promote an honest and fair securities
market to protect public investors." The lawfulness of complete nondisclosure is not covered by the language of lOb-5."' The prohibition of
clauses (a) and (c) of lOb-5 are couched in terms of fraud without any
reference that failure to provide material nonpublic information might
run afoul of section 10(b).' Clause (b) prohibits affirmative misrepresentations which are half-truths, but does not, by its language, require one to speak in the first instance." The failure to disclose a
material fact is only fraudulent when it is necessary to make other
53. In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933), the
court adopted the "special facts" doctrine, but refused to impose a duty of disclosure
where the shares were purchased on a stock exchange.
54.

BALLENTINE, supra note 43, at 215.

55. In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933), the
court stated:
[a]n honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither buy nor
sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation without first seeking
out the other actual ultimate party to the transaction and disclosing to him
everything which a court or jury might later find that he knew affecting the real or
speculative value of such shares. Business of that nature is to be governed by practical rules.
56. A New Concept, supra note 42, at 564.

57. It has been contended that the term fraud as used in the Act was not limited
to common law concepts, but was intended to include "all deceitful practices contrary
to plain rules of common honesty." Loss, The SEC and the Broker-Dealer, 1 VAND.
L. REV. 516, 517 (1948) (citing People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38, 154

N.E. 655, 657-58 (1926)).
58. A New Concept, supra note 42, at 565.
59. See note 1 supra.
60. See SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
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statements made not misleading. 6 ' The legislative history of section
10(b) is equally unrevealing in that it fails to indicate a congressional
intent to include within its ambit trading without disclosure.62 Consequently, the law initially governing the duty to disclose under lOb-5
was the same as the various common law views declared by the state
courts. 6 3

1. Insiders.
State law gradually supplanted by a new body of federal corporation law as a result of the Securities Exchange Act," ' and more
specifically lOb-5. This federal law was given substance with respect to
the application of lOb-5 to the nondisclosure of material nonpublic information in Cady, Roberts & Co. 65 In Cady, Roberts, the SEC
brought a disciplinary action under 10b-5 against a broker of Cady,
Roberts & Co., a broker-dealer firm, who received information about
a proposed cut in the dividends of Curtiss-Wright Corporation. The
information was received from one of the brokerage firm's partners,
who was also a director of Cutiss-Wright Corporation. Knowing that
the information had not reached the exchange and been publicly
released, the broker executed two sell orders: one to sell shares of
Curtiss-Wright stock, and the other to sell short in the stock."' The
61. Note 1 supra, clause (b).
62. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1934).
63. For the discussion of the various common law views see notes 21-52 and accompanying text supra. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa. 1947), the first case permitting recovery under rule lOb-5, the court stated that if
the duty to disclose was found in general equitable principles if would fall under the
statute. The court found the defendant's conduct to come within the proscriptions of
the act by holding that "the broad terms of the Act are to be made effective in a case
like the present one through application of well known and well established equitable
principles governing fiduciary relationships." Id. at 803. This statement seems to in,dicate that the substantive law in Pennsylvania, which followed the so-called minority
view requiring disclosure, was applied in determining whether civil relief under rule
lob-5 was to be granted. At no time did the court intimate that the duty under rule
lOb-5 was greater than the common law duty to disclose. See Civil Liabilities, supra
note 28, at 556-57. See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 908 (D. Del.
1951).
64. Despite the decline in importance of a "Federal rule" as a result of Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the securities acts, which expressed an interest
which had hitherto been exclusively the concern of the states, generated a new and farreaching body of federal substantive corporation law. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3rd
Cir. 1961).

65. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
66. A seller who sells short in stock agrees, at the present market price, to deliver
the shares by some future date with the expectation that the price will drop before he
has to deliver them. S. HUEBNER, THE STOCK MARKET, 40-42 (_st ed. 1922).
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SEC held that the broker's failure to disclose the nonpublic information regarding Curtiss-Wright's dividend action violated rule lOb-5.
Since the purchasers were not shareholders of Curtiss-Wright
before consummation of the sales, the effect of Cady, Roberts is to expand the common law duty of disclosure to include sales of securities
made to non-stockholders. 67 The fulcrum of Cady, Roberts is that the
remedial anti-fraud concepts embodied in lOb-5 are to be effectuated
by rejecting the distinction existing at common law that an officer or
director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to stockholders with
whom he trades,"" but not to members of the public.6 The duty to
disclose emanates from "the existence of a relationship giving access...
to [corporate] information . . . and the inherent unfairness involved

where a party takes advantage of such information." ' The insider's
duty is regarded primarily in terms of access to nonpublic information,
and not solely in terms of a fiduciary duty based on trust and confidence. Emphasis is placed on identifying those persons who are in a
special relationship with the corporation, giving access to inside information.' Persons who are privy to a company's internal affairs must
suffer the correlative duties in trading in its securities.2
67. Chairman Cary, speaking for the Securities and Exchange Commission, rejected the selling broker's contention that "an insider's responsibility is limited to existing stockholders and ... he has no special duties when sales of securities are made to
non-stockholders." 40 S.E.C. 907, 913. It was further stated that "this approach is too
narrow . . . because [iut ignores the plight of the buying public-wholly unprotected
from the misuse of special information." Id.
68. Under the common law "strict rule" there was no fiduciary relationship even
between a director and individual stockholders. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text
supra.
69. The Commission stressed that
[Wihatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that
an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders
from whom he purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is
clearly not appropriate to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts
embodied in the securities acts.
40 S.E.C. at 913-14.
70. Id. at 912. The quoted material has been referred to as the "access test." This
test is used to determine whether a duty to disclose is required under rule lOb-5, and
states in its entirety, as follows:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose] rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. "Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." Id.
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Paradoxically, the broker in Cady, Roberts did not occupy any
corporate position within Curtiss-Wright Corporation. The SEC, however, refused to restrict application of lOb-5 to traditional insiders as
defined by section 16 of the Exchange Act. 7" Because the broker had
"access" to nonpublic information through a director or other insider,
he was subject to rule lOb-5 notwithstanding the absence of any relationship with the affected corporation.
The Cady, Roberts analysis for implying a duty to disclose has
served as the touchstone for subsequent judicial and adminstrative
decisions. 7 ' This belief was expressed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,75 by
76
describing the Cady, Roberts analysis as the "essence" of rule lOb-5.
In Texas Gulf, the SEC sought to enjoin and compel recission of
security transactions involving Texas Gulf Sulphur stock entered into
by several of its directors, officers, and employees. The Texas Gulf
court held that the defendants had contravened section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 by purchasing the stock of Texas Gulf without disclosure of nonpublic information.
In addition to an exposition of the Cady,
Roberts access delineation of insider, a broader definition of insider
was expounded to include "anyone in possession of material inside information."" This expanded definition of "insider" was construed to
bring within its purview not only the directors and management of73. Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act defines a corporate insider as "[e]very person
who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity securities ... or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such
security." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). The purpose of § 16(b) is to prevent the unfair
use of nonpublic information by requiring an insider to disgorge any profits "realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase . . .[of the issuer's
securities] within any period of less than six months." Id. § 78p(b).
74. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 805.
75. 401 F. 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
76. 401 F.2d at 848.
77. The inside information concerned the discovery and exploration of an extraordinary ore anamoly. Texas Gulf was charged with issuing a deceptive press release
designed to quell the rumors of the mineral discovery three days prior to the official
announcement. The effect of the statement announcing the discovery was so
devastating that the price of Texas Gulf stock rose from an opening price of 30 1/8 on
the day of its announcement to 58 1/4 approximately one month later. Id. at 847.
78. See Sandler & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform In The Securities
Marketplace, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 225, 241 (1969) (emphasis added)[hereinafter cited as
Sandier & Conwill]. Immediately after citing Cady, Roberts, the Texas Gulf court
defined the duties of an insider: "[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing
it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed." 401 F.2d at 848.
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ficers of Texas Gulf, but also its employees." According to Texas
Gulf, any person who gains possession of information as a result of
general accessibility to inside information by virtue of a corporate
position is classified as an insider. Once classifed as an insider the party
must, before trading, disclose the information to the public or abstain
from trading in the securities while the inside information remains undisclosed."
In imposing the duty to disclose Texas Gulf drew no distinction
between employees with positions of varying responsibilities.8" Under
Texas Gulf, therefore, lower echelon employees who become privy to
inside information through their relationship with the corporation will
fall within the group of insiders." The degree of the employees' involvement in corporate affairs should not be relevant since uninformed
investors are equally disadvantaged vis-a-vis lower echelon agents as
they would be with respect to a corporate director, except to the extent
that the higher level employees might at least superfically have more
reliable inside information."'
A vexing problem with the possession test of Texas Gulf is that the
court does not explicitly discuss the requirement of a relationship with
the affected corporation.' Application of the possession test, without
that relationship, could conceivably impose liability on a person who
inadvertantly overhears a private conversation, even though he has no
relationship to the corporation." Since Texas Gulf adopts the access
test of Cady, Roberts, by implication, a relationship to the affected
corporation is required." Read together, Texas Gulf and Cady,
79. The employees named as defendants for violating lOb-5 included a
geophysicist, a geologist, an accountant, and an office manager.
80. Id.
81. The defendants in Texas Gulf possessed a modicum of responsibility within
the corporate hierarchy, though some were technically lower echelon employees. It
follows that a strict interpretation of the decision requires the standards adopted by the
court to be limited to those types of employees and not viewed as binding upon all
types of corporate employees.
82. It seems as if the information need only be obtained "in the course" of the insiders employment and would include a secretary who learns of material information
while taking dictation, or a janitor who finds such information in a wastepaper basket.
See Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards And
Disclosure Obligations UnderRule lOb-5, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 809, 827, n.82 (1968) and
cases cited therein.
83. Sandler & Conwill, supra note 78, at 240.
84. 401 F.2d at 848.
85. It has been claimed that the access test of Cady, Roberts could impose liability
on a person under the same circumstances. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second
Round: Privity And State Of Mind In Rule lob-5 PurchaseAnd Sale Cases, 63 N.w.
U. L. REV. 423, 439 (1968). This proposition may be dismissed as specious since the access test specifically requires the existence of a relationship to the corporation.
86. 401 F.2d at 848.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/4

19811

COMMENTS

Roberts, require a duty to disclose when it is demonstrated that a
nexus exists between the insider and the corporation.8 7 For rule l0b-5
to be applicable, the undisclosed information that forms this nexus
must originate from the affected corporation. An obligation to
disclose may also be implied from a fiduciary relationship between the
trading parties, but the absence of a relationship founded on trust and
confidence will no longer be dispositive. More often, the proper inquiry will be whether the person trading in the shares is an insider. For
example, in General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc.,"s Talley Industries attempted to displace the management of General Time.
General Time claimed that rule lOb-5 had been violated because Talley
Industries had acquired stock of General Time without disclosing its
plan for a merger "whose terms might be more favorable than the
price paid for the stock being acquired."89 Talley Industries did not
utilize information of and had no fiduciary relation with General
Time. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that a purchaser of stock had no duty to disclose his knowledge of
future prospects unless he holds a fiduciary position with the seller or
has obtained his knowledge by virtue of an insider position, 9" neither
of which was satisfied in GeneralTime. 9 Insider status is not established
merely because there is an awareness of circumstances indicating that
there may be a profit-making opportunity in purchasing all or a controlling block of a company's shares.92 The tender offeror in General
Time was not required to disclose its intentions of a future tender offer
before purchasing the stock of General Time, the target company, on
the open market.93 Talley Industries, the offeror, may well have been
87. See Note, Rule lOb-5; Scope of Liability Extended as Former Outsiders
Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866, 879 (1979).
88. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
89. 403 F.2d at 164.
90. In General Time Judge Friendly said: "We know of no rule of law, applicable
at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary
relation to a prospective seller, and any obligation to reveal circumstances that might
raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale." Id.
91. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D. N.J. 1955). See 3 Loss,
supra note 8, at 1451-52.
92. Congress, through enactment of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)
(1976), has declared that purchases of target stock by a tender offeror before public
announcement of the offer are not fraudulent. The Williams Act delimits but does not
categorically prohibit such purchases. The purpose of the Act is to require tender offerors and prospective offerors to disclose information that will insure that public
shareholders may respond to a cash tender offer with adequate information.
Cooperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 594 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (citing Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)).
93. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 809-10. Jacobsen Mfr. Co. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 282 F. Supp. 598, 603 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Gulf & Western Indus. Inc. v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds,
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acting on nonpublic information, but there was no duty of disclosure
because the information was created by itself and did not emanate
from the target company."' The information was not obtained in the
capacity of an insider who, because of a relationship to the target company, had access to the inside information.' 5
While there has been a gradual expansion of insider liability, initiated in the case of Cady, Roberts, the one constant which permeates
all subsequent cases is the need to show that the alleged violator had
some connection with the affected corporation.
2.

Tippees

The proscriptions of rule lOb-5 have not been limited to the
widespread practice of insider trading. Tippees are also subject to the
rule. A tippee", generally trades on information that is not available to
the public, which is disseminated to him by an insider. Whether the
tippee or an insider trades on undisclosed information, the injury to
the investing public is essentially the same. The need to bring tippees
within rule lOb-5 was recognized as early as Cady, Roberts."7
Not until Investors Management Co. ,"' however, were tippees held
civilly liable for trading on material nonpublic information." Under
Investors Management, tippees violate lOb-5 when they improperly obtain nonpublic information by selective revelation from a corporate
476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). The legality of a prospective offeror's purchase of up to
five percent of a target company's stock is not otherwise affected by the Williams Act.
Only after five percent of the target company's stock is required is disclosure required.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(5).
94. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 6.3(622) (1969) (emphasis added).
95. [W]hile the prospective offeror's intention to make a tender offer may be
both material and nonpublic, it is information which relates to the plans of the offeror rather than the affairs of the target company. Accordingly, the prospective
offeror should have no fiduciary duty under... Rule 10b-5 to reveal its plans to
purchase additional shares despite the fact that disclosure of such information
would obviously affect the decision of sellers to dispose of their shares at the then
current market price (footnotes omitted).
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR

CORPORATE CONTROL 24 (1973).
96. See note 10 supra.
97. In a strict sense the broker-dealer in Cady, Roberts was a tippee of the insiderdirector, but was treated as an insider and held liable on that basis.
98. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
99. Investors Management involved the proposed sale of McDonnell Douglas
convertible debentures for which Merrill Lynch acted as the underwriter. Information
was received by Merrill Lynch about a sharp reduction of earnings forecasts for
McDonnell Douglas. This information was then passed from Merrill Lynch salesman
to various institutional investors who promptly sold a large portion of their McDonnell
Douglas stock holdings before the information became public.
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source and know or have reason to know of the nonpublic character of
the information.' The SEC specifically rejected the requirement that
the recipient occupy a special relationship to the corporation, or, in the
absence of a relationship, that he have actual knowledge that the information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty not to reveal the information.' 0 1 Conceptually, Investors Management would require
disclosure by a person such as the taxi cab driver, the barber, or the
caddy who fortutiously overhears a piece of corporate news, with
knowledge of its corporate source.' 2 Even though trading on this inside information could have a deleterious effect on the investing
public, none of these individuals have any relationship to the corporation. According to Investors Management, these "tippees" would
nevertheless have a duty to disclose because they are aware of the illicit
nature of the information and therey obtain a superior trading position
in relation to other investors. 0 3 In a concurring opinion, Commissioner Smith sought to emphasize that the prohibitions of lOb-5 should
focus on the conduct of insiders and their tippees, rather than on a
concept of relative informational advantage.1 ° ' What the Commissioner found controlling was the nexus of a special relationship between the tipper and the issuer and the tippee's knowledge of that relationship.'" In order to be liable, therefore, the tippee must know or
have reason to know that he acquired nonpublic information in breach
of the tipper's fiduciary duty to maintain confidentiality.' 0' The tippee's knowledge would render him a participant in the breach when he
acts on the basis of that information.'
100.

44 S.E.C. at 641.

101.

Id. at 643.

102. Ironically, a member of the SEC stated in 1965 that these types of individuals
should not be contemplated as being named as defendants in civil actions by the Commission under lOb-5. Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is And What It
Isn 't, CORP. SECRETARY No. 127 (1965); See 6 Loss, supra note 10, at 3564.
103.

44 S.E.C. at 644.

104. Id. at 648. Commissioner Smith stressed the importance of policing insiders
and what they do instead of policing information per se and its possession. Id.
105. "The nexus of the special relationship between Merrill Lynch and [McDonnell] Douglas and [the tippee's] knowledge of that relationship as the source of the information [was] essential to [the] case," Id.
106. Id. A tippee who has knowledge of the breach in trust would be liable to the
same extent as an insider by application of the doctrine in the law of restitution:
"Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicated confidential information to a third person, the third person, if he had notice of the violation of
duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes
through use of such information." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 201(2). See 3

Loss, supra note 8, at 1451.
107.

44 S.E.C. at 650.
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Commissioner Smith's more restrictive definition of tippee comports more with a relationship requirement than the majority's test of
''mere possession" with knowledge of the source of the
information.' 8 A tippee who acts with knowledge of the breach of a
fiduciary duty acts with a greater degree of culpability than a tippee
who acquires information only knowing that it is of a nonpublic
nature.' 0 9 The greater the degree of the tippee's culpability the less attenuated his relationship with the corporation. As a matter of fairness,
it is essential that a test be formulated that will ferret out culpable tippees and not hold tippees liable when they had no reason to suspect the
blameworthiness of their conduct.P1 Liability where the recipient of
the information is unaware of a fiduciary obligation may "penalize or
thwart the quest for new knowledge by investors.'"" A vigilant tippee
who suspects an allegedly improper source may have to forego a transaction that had the prospect of being a profitable investment." ' Application of the standard espoused in Investors Management-possession and actual or constructive knowledge of its corporate
source-might cause investors who indirectly receive inside information " 3 to be reluctant in trading on that information.
The untoward nature of the Investors Management standard is intensified by the spector of tippee liability when a tippee has only constructive knowledge that the information was acquired from a corporate source. Actual knowledge should be a prerequisite for the line
of demarcation of tippee liability."' Logically, a tippee needs actual
108. See Barnett, Neither A Tipper Nor A Tippee Be, 8 Hous. L. REV. 278, 286
(1970), wherein the author voices approval of a relationship requirement as opposed to

a test of "mere possession."
109. Aside from the need for distinguishing between kinds of tippees a differentiation should exist between an insider and a tippee. An insider would have a degree of
knowledge which makes his culpability more closely approach that of a tippee who is

aware of a breach of fiduciary trust than a tippee who is ignorant of the breach. See
Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability And Rule lOb-5, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55, 69 [hereinafter
cited as Rapp & Loeb].
110. See Rapp & Loeb, supra note 109 at 86. The second prong of the access test of
Cady, Roberts only considers it to be unfair when a party takes advantage of corporate

information who knows it is unavailable to those with whom he deals. 40 S.E.C. at
912.
111. 44S.E.C. at 648.
112. See Comment, Investors Management Company And Rule lOb-5-The Tippee At Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 552 (1972), in which it is noted that a tippee who

publicly discloses corporate information may still encounter the risk of a lob-5 violation.
113. Of course, a tippee who receives information from a person not privy to corporate affairs may be liable. A tippee may acquire inside information from another
tippee. This is what happened in Investors Management.
114. 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, 3-277 (rev. ed. 1978)[hereinafter
cited as JACOBS].
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knowledge of inside information before he can tip it. Moreover, the
constructive knowledge standard is contrary to the admonition in
Cady, Roberts that liability be based on actual knowledge by the receipient of the inside character of the information." ' Of equal force, is
the holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder."6 Because Hochfelder requires some element of scienter-intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud"' 7-a plaintiff should be required to prove that a tippee had
actual knowledge of the corporate source of his information."' Under
Investors Management, a tippee could negligently trade on nonpublic
information with constructive knowledge that it was acquired from a
confidential source and nevertheless be found to have violated
l0b-5." 9 This result is seemingly in conflict with the holding in
Hochfelder. The incongruity created is that a person can be a tippee
because he should know a fact, but according to Hochfelder he cannot
be held liable unless he acted with scienter.' 20
Whatever the basis for tippee liability, trading on confidential information by a tippee could be as equally reprehensible as trading on
that information by an insider.' 2 ' To prevent the use of nonpublic information by a tippee, the tipper is discouraged from making the initial disclosure which is the first link in the chain of dissemination.' 2 2 A
measure designed to deter the tipper from tipping is the imposition of a
duty to disclose.' 2 3 The tipper is less likely to risk liability by tipping,
which provides no direct pecuniary gain, than the tippee is in
trading.' 2 ' Liability is founded on the premise that the tipper's act has
115.

Cf. 40 S.E.C. at 911 with note 100 and accompanying text supra. How can a

tippee who does not have knowledge of the nonpublic nature of the information
disclose it to the public? Such a tippee, if he had reason to know of the corporate
source of the information, could be found liable under lOb-5. But cf. BROMBERG,
supra note 12, § 7.5(6)(c), at 190.16.
116. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

117. Id. at 201. Hochfelder did not decide whether reckless conduct is sufficient to
establish scienter.
118. Id. at 193, n.12. Some courts have held that a showing of negligence is sufficient to constitute scienter under lOb-5. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730
(9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968).
119. Accord Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974).
120. JACOBS, supra note 114, at 3-282.
121. 401 F.2d at 852-53.
122. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (J. Godbold,
dissenting opinion), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
123. A tipper does not breach lob-5 if his tippee neither tips nor trades, though
there is no judicial authority on the issue. See BROMBERG supra note 12, at § 7.5(4),
190.1.

124. Comment, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule lob-5, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 372, 379 (1971).
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indirectly damaged the investor to as great a degree as if the tippee had
traded on the information.' 25 From an equity standpoint, a tipper
should have a duty to disclose because he enables another to profit by
the use of information he is barred from exploiting. 26 Imposition of a
duty to disclose also assures the investor of the right to a civil action
against, the tipper. 2 7 Since a tippee who does not know or have reason
to know that the information was of a corporate origin will not be held
liable, the availability of a legal action against the tipper may be the in28
vestor's only remedy.
3.

Special Relationship

Although lOb-5 liability has largely attached to insiders and tippees, the finding of a special relationship remains useful in establishing
a duty to disclose under two instances. Traditional fiduciary concepts
have usually been utilized to create a special relationship between a
broker' 2 9 and his customers. A duty arises, not because the broker
possesses nonpublic inside information, but because the broker occupies a position of trust and confidence in relation to his customers.
A broker usually possesses information which relates solely to the
market. For the most part, this market information" ' is public and, at
least theoretically, obtainable by the broker's customers. Nevertheless,
a broker has a duty to "disclose to his customer, toward whom he acts
125. Rapp & Loeb, supra note 109, at 80. Unlike trading on tipped information,
tipping cannot be based on restitution for unjust enrichment since a tipper, in that
capacity, may only tip and not reap any profit for his own account. Id.
126. 82 HARV. L. REV. 938, 942 (1969).
127. A tipper is liable to persons trading with his direct and indirect tippees. See
generally Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237
(2d Cir. 1974) (liability extended to non-trading tippers); Elkind v. Liffett & Meyers,
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 41-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d
700 (5th Cir. 1969), a tippee who sued his tipper because he was given an inferior tip
was denied recovery because he was in pari delicto with the tipper.
128. The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf gave its reasons for extending liability to
tippers:
[W]ithout such a remedy, insiders could easily evade their duty to refrain from
trading on the basis of inside information. Either the transactions so traded could
be concluded by a relative or an acquaintance of the insider, or implied
understandings could arise under which reciprocal tips between insiders in different corporations could be given.
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971). If the tippee is outside the court's jurisdiction the tipper may be the only party
against whom the injured party could assert his remedy. See Rapp & Loeb, supra note
109, at 80.
129. A broker is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others. . . ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78(c)(a)(4) (1976).
130. A definition of market information is provided at note 13 supra.
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in the position of a fiduciary, all facts. . . pertaining to the customer's
purchases,' 3 ' including those which are public. In contrast to an insider or tippee, whose duty is founded on superior access and possession of inside information, the liability of a broker is actuated by his
superior access to market information and his fiduciary relationship.
The other instance in which lOb-5 liability may attach, because of a
special relationship, involves the issuer itself. No apparent reason exists for differentiating between trading by the issuer and trading by an
insider or tippee.' 32 Initially, it might appear that the imposition of a
duty upon the issuer will conflict with the fiduciary duty of directors
and officers to purchase the corporation's securities at the lowest
price. The ready answer to this quandry is that any obligation which
management may have under local law to reacquire a corporation's
securities at bargain prices is subservient to the issuer's duty to disclose
pursuant to l0b-5.'3 The issuer, then, may be liable for nondisclosure
to the same extent as an insider or tippee.
4.

Duty to Disclose Market Information?

Examination of recent decisions indicate a predilection to erode the
relationship requirement of Cady, Roberts. In S.E.C. v. Great
American Industries Inc.,' " the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit expressed a willingness to extend the duty of
disclosure beyond that resulting from application of insider analysis.
In Great American, the SEC sought to enjoin violations of lOb-5 by
persons who sold mining properties to Great American in exchange for
its stock. The seller failed to notify Great American that a substantial
part of the selling price included finder's fees. The majority of the
court, sitting en banc, did not decide whether the seller had a duty of
disclosure, because the facts presented involved more than were nondisclosure.' 35 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Kaufman
forcefully emphasized that, at least in injunctive actions, 10b-5 should
not be circumscribed by traditional notions of fiduciary
responsibility. 3' 6
131. Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added).
"The broker has a high standard of fair dealing and full disclosure imposed upon him
flowing from the reliance customers place in his advice and expertise." R. FROME & V.
ROSENZWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS 176 (1975).
132. Disclosure is not required when securities, which are not convertible, are
callable at the issuer's option. 6 Loss, supra note 10, at 1453.
133. Id. at 1453-54.
134. 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
135. 407 F.2d at 460-61.
136. The majority of the court concluded that "[to read] lOb-5 as placing an affirmative duty of disclosure on persons who ... did not occupy a special relationship to a
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Great American demonstrates the judiciary's proclivity to further
expand established fiduciary concepts. A judicial inclination to distend
lOb-5 was finally transformed into judicial edict in United States v.
Chiarella.'" The defendant in Chiarella was employed as a "markup
man ''1 38 in the composing room of Pandick Press, a firm. specializing
in the printing of various financial papers required for the invitation of
tender offers. To avoid an anticipatory rise in the market price of a
target company's stock, confidentiality was preserved by having the
type set with vital information absent or in code. Undaunted, Chiarella
was able to decipher the code and determine the names of the target
companies.' 3 9 He then purchased shares of the target's stock and immediately sold out after public announcement of the tender offers. "I
Shortly thereafter, the SEC investigated Chiarella's activities. The investigation resulted in Chiarella's agreement to execute a consent
decree and disgorge his profits to the sellers from whom he has purchased the stock. He was subsequently indicted and convicted of
willful violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5."
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Chiarella argued that he was not an insider of the target companies and, therefore, had no duty to the selling shareholders."12 The
court refused to accept this argument on the grounds that insider
status was simply irrelevant."13 In so doing, the court announced an
seller or buyer of securities, would be occupying new ground and would require most
careful consideration." Id. at 460. Judge Kaufman seemed prepared to occupy this
new ground:
Those who buy or sell securities may no longer assume that the unmended fences
of common law fraud will remain the outer limits of liability under Rule lOb-5 ...
[Tihe rule's proscription is considered to be 'closer to unfairness than fraud'.
[Any claim that material facts were withheld . ..must be scrutinized with care,
whether or not there would have been liability at common law for such a deed.
Id. at 462-63 (Kaufam, J., concurring).
137. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
138. Chiarella was the first
person to receive copies from the customer. After he
selected the type front and page layout the manuscript was sent out to be typeset. 588
F.2d at 1363.
139. The target's name was deduced by use of other information in the documents
such as price histories, pr values, and the number of letters in the fictitious corporate
name. Id. at 1363.
140. Between September 1975 and November 1976 Chiarella's trading netted him a
profit of more than $30,000. Id.
141. The indictment was brought under § 32(a), the penalty provision of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). This section provides criminal penalties for wilful violations
of the securities laws.
142. 588 F.2d at 1364.
143. Id.
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unprecedented rule for nondisclosure liability under rule lOb-5. The
Second Circuit said that "[a4nyone--corporate insider or not-who
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty
to disclose.""" Support for this novel test was drawn from the broad
remedial purpose of the antifraud provisions. To ensure that all investors have relatively equal access to material nonpublic information
the court declared that lOb-5 should be equally applicable to the
5
market insider as it is to the corporate insider."
Of particular importance was the court's attempt to distinguish
Chiarella's conduct from that of the tender offeror's, by reasoning
that an offeror is not a market insider."' The foundation for the
distinction is that an offeror does not receive nonpublic information,
as Chiarella did, but creates it. Furthermore, an offeror undertakes an
economic risk by making a tender offer at a premium above the preoffer price, based on its evaluation of market information. In assuming a risk an offeror serves a useful function within the market, by forcing the market to reflect a fair price."' Conversely, Chiarella's
market activity, for which he assumed virtually no economic risk, had
an adverse effect on the market by creating an artificial demand for
'
the stock of the target companies.
In reversing the Second Circuit's decision, the United State
Supreme Court rebuked the Second Circuit's failure to identify a relationship between Chiarella and the target companies or the sellers.""
The Supreme Court held that a rule which makes trading on market information fraudulent, because it is unfair, suffers from two defects.
First, financial unfairness does not, in every instance, constitute
fraudulent activity under lOb-5."° Second, and more fundamentally,
there must be a duty to disclose to make silence fraudulent.
Chiarella's activities, even though egregious, were insufficient to
trigger a duty under established doctrine. There was no fiduciary rela1
tionship to the selling stockholders or to the target companies." It
144. Id. at 1365. If one cannot disclose then one must abstain from buying or selling. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 1366.
147. Id. at 1367 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)).
148. 588 F.2d at 1367.
149. 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1116 (1980).
150. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977)).
151. 100 S. Ct. at 1117. Early in the majority opinion the Supreme Court seemed
to imply that a complete stranger who deals with sellers over an impersonal market exchange has no duty to disclose. As will be demonstrated, later portions of the opinion
are indicative of a contrary implication.
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would indeed be a strained distinction to discern any difference between Chiarella's purchases and the open market purchases made by
the offerors, who possessed the same information.'" Under General
Time the purchase of stock by the offerors would not have been a rule
10b-5 violation because the information was not acquired from the
target companies.'" Analytically, it should be of no consequence that
the information was created by the offeror companies rather than
generated through Chiarella's efforts. In either event, the information
did not derive from the issuer corporation.
In stark contrast to the broker in Cady, Roberts and the employees
in Texas Gulf, Chiarella was not an insider. At no time did he have access to or possession of inside information.' 5 Nor was inside information given to him by a tipper. The information was obtained indirectly
from the offerors who were free to trade on the information without
contemplation of a 10b-5 violation. To be subject to the "disclose or
abstain" rule of Texas Gulf an investor must be in possession of
"material inside information."'" The information must originate
from the issuer company. Similarly, Cady, Roberts requires that the
information derive from a source within the company whose shares are
traded.
Chiarella seems unwilling to extend the scope of nondisclosure
liability beyond thatestablished in Cady, Roberts. A reason for not expanding the duty is that it is an act that should not be within the province of judicial decisionmaking. The Supreme Court observed that
Congress has provided detailed and specific regulation when the need
for expansion has been required.' Through the William's Act, for example, Congress has, in effect, created a duty of disclosure when a
tender offeror purchases more than five percent of a target company's
stock.'" The information which the offeror possesses is market information, but the legislature has opined that it be regulated.
It is clear that the Supreme Court is not expanding the duty beyond
that established in Cady, Roberts. Chiarella, however, could
reasonably be interpreted as restricting the duty to disclose. The
Court's repeated references to "fiduciary duty".'5 8 infers that the duty
152. See notes 93-95 supra.
153. It is assumed that the prospective tender offeror purchases less than five percent of the target stock. See notes 92 and 93 supra.
154. Chiarella did have inside information of the tender offeror companies. He
abstained from trading in the stock of the offeror companies and was not held liable
Dn this basis.
155. 401 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
156. 100 S. Ct. at 1117.
157. See note 93 supra.
158. 100 S. Ct. at 1114, 1115, 1117.
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under lOb-5 should go no further than that required under state law.
The better reasoned interpretation indicates that the Court is merely
circumscribing the decision in Cady, Roberts. Careful inspection of the
Court's language compels this conclusion.
An insider does not stand in a fiduciary relation to a purchaser of
stock (i.e. a non-stockholder). But Chiarelli recognized a duty to
disclose owed to a purchaser of stock.1 " A fortiori, Chiarella did not
restrict the duty established in Cady, Roberts, which requires
disclosure to the purchaser of stock. Perhaps it is the Court's analysis
which adumbrates the effect its decision has on Cady, Roberts.
Chiarellamay be interpreted as requiring proof of a fiduciary relationship, but not necessarily one between the alleged violator and the investor. The fiduciary obligations owed to the corporation by virtue of
the insider's corporate position may be the factor which gives rise to
the duty an insider owes to the prospective purchaser of stock. 6 "
Although market information may provide a trading advantage,
Chiarellarefused to extend a duty of disclosure to include the group of
market participants to whom market information is available. Nevertheless, application of the market insider approach goes a long way in
bridging the gap in structural disparities in access to material information.' 6 ' Since the securities laws seek to foster public investment by instilling confidence in the market, a rule which prevents exploitation of
structural informational advantages would help to achieve this goal. 6 2
On the other hand, a rule which requires disclosure of all nonpublic information closely resembles adoption of a parity of information requirement, which is a vague guideline with which to license appropriate
conduct applicable to all market participants. In terms of legal theory,
such an approach represents a radical departure from current case law,
because no relationship between the trading parties or with the affected corporation is required. 63
As a practical matter, imposition of a duty may become difficult in
159. Id. at 1114. Because the Court treats insiders separately from fiduciaries it is
fair to conclude that an insider need not have a relationship of trust and confidence to
the person with whom he trades. Id. at 1115.
160. Chiarellaaccepted the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand that,
the director or officer [i.e. insiders] assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by
the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage
of his position to induce the buyer into a position of a beneficiary although he was
forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one.
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). See
100 S. Ct. at 1114, n.8.
161. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 808.
162. Id. at 816.
163. Id.
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attempting to trace information to determine if it was derived from a
nonpublic source. Considerable difficulties also arise in defining an informational advantage. The sophisticated financial analyst who brings
to bear his superior ability to exhume additional facts from nonpublic
information, under the market insider theory, would seemingly be required to disclose the bare nonpublic information, if not also the
results of his financial analysis. 6" Were the analyst only required to
disclose the bare nonpublic facts administrative havoc would prevail,
because the analyst would have to sift through a morass of information to separate the bare facts from the fruits of his financial savvy.
This same problem would result if possession of the nonpublic information were relayed to a tippee. Consistency suggests that the tippee
be required to disclose not only the nonpublic information, but also
any informational advantage gained through his, and/or the tipper's
economic acumen.
The unlimited number of ways in which nonpublic information
may be acquired makes it difficult for the investor to know what to
disclose. Uncertainty, therefore, will probably cause market participants not to trade and "place undesirable inhibitions on investor
trading.'" "
The parity of information approach does not require a showing of
fraud. In Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,"' however, the United
State Supreme Court held that not every instance of financial unfairness will constitute fraudulent activity under lOb-5. 6 7 The applicability of Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 depends upon the establishment of fraud. Section 10(b) may be a catch-all provision, "but what it
6 8
catches must be fraud.'1
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court was afforded the opportunity to
decide just how far lOb-5 went in catching fraud, but did not resolve
the issue. The majority of the Court specifically declined to decide
whether the breach of the fiduciary duty Chiarella owed to the offeror
companies'6 9 was sufficient to support a lOb-5 action brought by the

164.

Under a party of information approach the astute financial analylist could be

required to disclose the results of his economic analysis to the poor widow in Maine
who acts without the aid of similar financial skills.
165. Id. at 817.

166. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
167. Id. at 474-77.
168. 100 S. Ct. at 1118.
169. Chiarella did not dispute the proposition that he had "violated his duty as an
agent of the offeror corporations not to use their confidential information for personal
profit." Id. at 1123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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selling shareholders.'" Not exercising similar deference, Chief Justice
Burger proposed that lOb-5 activated when an informational advantage is obtained by unlawful means, such as by the breach of a fiduciary
relationship."' According to Chief Justice Burger one must examine
the manner in which the trading party has obtained his trading advantage to determine if lOb-5 has been contravened."' Thus, the commission of fraud, irrespective upon whom it is committed, would require
disclosure of the ill-gotten information or refrainment from trading.
Chief Justice Burger relied on Chiarella's obligation not to defraud the
offeror corporations in creating a duty to the disgruntled investors.
The theory for the creation of the duty is built on the unlawfulness of
purloining nonpublic information.
Supportive of Chief Justice Burger's theory is the literal language
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. These anti-fraud provisions extend to
"any" fraudulent device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.'" 3 Rule lOb-5 does not categorize the "persons" against whom fraud must be committed for it to apply. In short,
a literal reading of lOb-5 would find Chiarella's misappropriation of
confidential information, in breach of his fiduciary obligation to the
offeror companies, sufficient to constitute fraud against the investors
with whom he traded.
"But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary?""' Chiarella
was a fiduciary of the offeror corporations, not a fiduciary of the investors with whom he traded. He did not have a duty to take a position
non-adverse to the selling shareholders.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent is difficult to justif) with the holding
in Green. Green held that not all breaches of fiduciary duty are adequate to establish a violation of lOb-5.'I Green rejected mere reliance
on the term "fraud" to bring within the scope of lOb-5 all breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction."' Moreover,
170. In opposing certiorari, the United States argued that the defendant's breach
of duty to the offerors was adequate to support a conviction for violation of lOb-5. See
Brief for the United States in opposition to petition for a writ of certiorari in U.S. v.
Chiarella. The majority in Chiarella did not decide the merit of this theory because it
was not submitted to the jury in the district court. 100 S. Ct. at 1118.
171. Id. at 1120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1120-21 (citing Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15
TEx. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1936) (emphasis added)).

173.

See notes 1 and 2 supra.

174.
175.

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
430 U.S. at 476.

176.

Id. at 472.
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unlike the minority shareholders in Green whose claim of fraud was
"in connection with the sale" of stock' the offeror companies in
Chiarella were not sellers of the target company's stock. Under the
Birnbaum doctrine,' 8 no actionable violation of lOb-5 could have
been successfully asserted by the offeror companies because they did
not trade with Chiarella. In effect, Chief Justice Burger has resurrected
a cause of action for the benefit of the aggrieved investors, based on a
fraud committed against parties who themselves had no standing to sue
under lOb-5.
Stare decisis dictated that there was no duty to disclose in
Chiarella. The aberrational factual setting in which Chiarella arose is
simply not an appropriate case for the adoption of a new and expansive basis for lOb-5 liability.
III.

CONCLUSION

The broad language of lOb-5 has been used as a mechanism to effectuate the prophylactic features of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Consistent with the underlying tenets of a competitive economy
the Act was designed to foster public confidence in the securities
market. In pursuit of this end, the judiciary has gradually expanded
the duty of disclosure under the Act's anti-fraud provisions. But the
imposition of a duty has been subject to one unyielding common
denominator throughout the period of its expansion. The sine qua non
of a lOb-5 duty of disclosure is the finding of a fiduciary relationship
between the trading parties, or a nexus between the alleged violator
and the affected corporation.
Salutory as the anti-fraud provisions may be, the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged that limitations should be placed on
the scope of lOb-5. General references to the remedial purpose of the
Securities Exchange Act will no longer support a broad interpretation
of lOb-5." 9 An overly expansive approach would render the other ex177. In Green, the defendant, Santa Fe Industries, attempted a statutory merger
with Kirby Lumber Company, of whose stock it owned 15 percent. Pursuant to
Delaware's "short form merger statute" the defendant offered to make payment for
the share of Kirby's minority shareholders, whose consent of the merger was not required. The minority shareholders objected to the merger and, instead of petitioning
for the payment of the fair market value of their shares as determined by a courtappointed appraiser, brought an action under lob-5 to set aside the merger as
fraudulent. Id. at 465-68.
178. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), which met
with the approbation of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
limited private relief for violation of lob-5 to persons who are either purchasers or
sellers of a security.
179. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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press civil liability sections of the securities Act superflous, and would
be inconsistent with the limitations Congress built into those
sections. 8 If the duty to disclose needs to be expanded, congressional
action or SEC rulemaking will be a more appropriate response than
stretching the existing law to cover perceived gaps in rule 1Ob-5.' 8
Thomas J. Troetti
180.

401 F.2d at 867-68.

181.

588 F.2d at 1376 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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